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Introduction
The mobility of criminals is an increasingly important determinant of optimal crime investigations and deterrence. Particularly in densely populated areas, criminals may swiftly cross district boundaries and keep organizing their activities across the districts, which establishes a strong rationale for enhanced cooperation between local authorities. More precisely, the lack of cooperation brings in uncompensated external effects of local enforcement efforts, both of a positive and negative form. Overall crime reduction is a chief positive externality of local spending, whereas crime diversion, resulting from the voluntary displacement of criminals into other districts, is a major negative externality. Combining the two opposing effects, a noncooperative decentralized equilibrium may well feature either insufficient as well as excessive effort (Pinto, 2007 ).
Yet what if criminals are mobile, but criminal targets and victims of crimes are not? In that case, the spatial displacement of criminals is no longer equivalent to crime diversion. Criminals strategically relocate to districts with the lowest effective level of deterrence (weakest-link districts), yet they maintain the criminal business in the initial districts. Their relocation has zero effect on the new residential district. Thus, the inter-jurisdictional spillovers of local spending on crime deterrence are purely positive, and one should expect an unambiguous underprovision in decentralization. Given that most of law enforcement within metropolitan areas, particularly in the United States and Canada, is conducted by local police departments (Cheikbossian and Marceau, 2007) , this class of crimes calls for a careful re-assessment of the pros and cons of decentralization.
In this paper, we aim to show that for a class of perfectly mobile criminals targeting immobile victims, the decentralization of local non-rival deterrence is likely to be welfare superior to centralization. This is as long as decentralization allows for voluntary transfers to the other districts, and if strategic delegation is available. Our study thereby shows that in the case of strategic adversaries, decentralization of crime deterrence does not require scale effects (Wheaton 2006) or majority-rule exploitation (Cheikbossian and Marceau 2007) to be superior to centralization.
The relation to the classic decentralization theorem deserves a special note here: By decentralization theorem, the welfare surplus of centralization increases (or, welfare loss decreases) in the level of spillovers. Notice that the level of spillovers intuitively represents the interdependence between the districts, hence the standard reading is that the interdependence of districts makes centralization relatively more desirable. In our case, however, if opportunities or incentives for the relocation of criminals increase, and the districts become more interdependent, the centralization is less likely to dominate decentralization, and not the other way around. In another context, Koethenbuerger (2008) also finds that the superiority of decentralization over centralization may increase in the level of spillovers.
The paper aims to contribute to the vast literature on the ebbs and flows of decentralization. The first generation of fiscal federalism perceived decentralization only as a safeguard against uniform policies for asymmetrical districts. In the second generation of fiscal federalism (Oates 2005) , decentralization is endorsed because of additional benefits such as X-efficiency or accountability (Hindriks and Lockwood, 2009 ; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007). Besley and Coate (2003) prove that decentralization under standard assumptions is also delegation-proof, i.e. voters have no incentive for strategic delegation. Lockwood (2008) points out the benefits of decentralization under a skewed income distribution. Cheikbossian (2008) claims that the high elasticity of the influence functions of pressure groups eliminates a surplus in centralization, even for large spillovers. In the context of urban crime mobility, Bandyopadhyay, Pinto and Wheeler (2007) add that the tradeoff of underprovision and X-efficiency of decentralization crucially hangs on labor mobility.
Following Besley and Coate (2003) , we assume a two-stage game with voters grouped in two districts and two delegates, one per district. Alternatively, we can consider local councils delegating police officials in charge of deterrence. In Stage 1, voters in each district simultaneously elect their policy-seeking delegate. In Stage 2, the delegates simultaneously decide on the local expenditures on deterrence. Taken from a production point of view, local public spending is spending on a district-specific input (local deterrence), and the inputs are complements to the production of districtspecific outputs (protection against district-specific crimes). The production functions are district-specific in the sense that the domestic input enters perfectly and the foreign input enters imperfectly. We will specifically focus on the willingness to cover the costs of the production of the local input in the other district. In the electoral game of voters, we will further examine incentives to elect strategically; we will concentrate on whether voting for a less or more interested delegate will extract extra payments from the other district.
From the technical point of view, the main difference to the original setup is that local enforcement levels are not substitutes, but complements. Partial motivation for this extension has already been provided already by Besley and Coate (2003, fn. 15) , who anticipated that their main result may not be robust when applied to different aggregations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the setup. Section 3 outlines the model and solves for the social optimum serving as the benchmark for welfare judgments. Section 4 solves for equilibria in decentralization both with and without transfers. It develops a key sufficient condition for decentralization with transfers to deliver the social optimum. Section 5 examines cooperative centralization under fixed cost-sharing rules and for Nash bargaining. Section 6 explicitly formulates the decentralization tradeoffs for all possibilities: transfer/no transfer, sincere/strategic delegation and fixed/Nash bargaining cost-sharing rules under centralization. Section 7 concludes.
Crime organization and deterrence
Our focus is on a special class of criminal activities and a special subset of police efforts. Traditionally, crime is thought to be an activity taking place completely within a single district. With improvements in communication technologies, crime can nevertheless be organized across several districts. As a result, the locations of crime targets may differ from the actual location of the criminal organization; activities damaging individuals in District 1 can be effectively organized in District 2. At the same time, the relocation of criminals from District 1 does not hurt District 2 as long as activities committed by these criminals are district-specific. The class of criminal activities relevant to our analysis is described by the following two conditions:
1. Immobile (district-targeted) crime. Nearly all victims or targets of criminals are concentrated within a single district. This is specifically the case whenever districts are heterogeneous, so crime is highly district-specific. For instance, car thefts are concentrated in residential areas of middle-income and high-income households. Drugs bring in a large social cost in districts with a high concentration of juveniles. We assume the perfect immobility of the victims, which is realistic at least in the short term.
2. Perfectly mobile criminals. A dominant portion of crime's "production process" is mobile: storing and reselling stolen goods, remodeling stolen cars, money laundering, setting meeting points and distribution points, or providing private rooms or hotel rooms for escort services. Thus, we have to distinguish between target districts and residence districts. The former are districts of the victims, and the latter are districts of the criminals.
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Technology of crime deterrence is characterized as follows:
1. Deterrence is local and not crime-specific, with the property of a local public good. In other words, it targets all suspicious individuals, and all criminal activities in the district, not investigating or preventing individual cases. We may think of intelligence and operative activities: 1 monitoring flows of goods, identifying suspicious individuals, exploiting local informers, or penetrating re-sale networks. Non-rivalry implies that the number of criminals with a residence in a district is irrelevant for effective deterrence in the district. As we shall see below, since the Tiebout-sorting of criminals occurs in equilibrium, rivalry or synergy should not change anything substantial in the margins.
2. Asymmetrical productivity. The local police more likely deter criminals pursuing domestic crimes rather than criminals pursuing crimes elsewhere. Asymmetrical productivity might be related to the exploitation of information complementarities and tacit local knowledge. Tao (2004) suggests domestic interests: the police use resources and exert effort mainly to the purpose of identifying criminals relevant for their own district, not the other districts. Another point is that the productivity gap cannot be filled in by transferring resources, which might be again attributed to local knowledge or local autonomy: The police of District 1 might improve enforcement in District 2 only through intermediaries, or the voluntary transfer of homogenous (district-non-specific) assets.
Consider three examples: The first is drug sale targeting a special group (e.g., juveniles) residing in a single district. The only activity inevitably taking place within a target district is advertising, whereas storage and distribution may easily take place elsewhere. The second example is illegal prostitution via escort services, where, again, the only advertising may take place within a target district, as long as customers are willing to move. (This case also shows that victimless crimes likely satisfy the condition of a target district to be independent of a residence district.)
We can also consider car thefts, where the only activity within a target district is to get into the car; hiding, remodeling and reselling the car can be done anywhere else. Exactly the same holds for organized property crimes that aim chiefly at the resale of easily transportable valuables such as jewelry or paintings. For all these cases, the deterrence we model involves mostly information, monitoring, and surveillance, that are all non-rival, and not crime-specific efforts.
Model

Assumptions
Assume two districts of unit size, i = 1, 2. (Extensions beyond the bilateral case are discussed in Section 6). In each district i, there is a continuum of citizens differing only in their preference for crime protection, λ ∈ R + , distributed by F i (λ). This may reflect an individual value of damage, probability of becoming a crime target, or wealth effect implying different levels of absolute risk aversion. Like Besley and Coate (2003) , suppose that a mean is identical to a median, denoted λ m , and they are the same in the two districts: 2 ∞ 0 λF i (λ)dλ = λ m and F i (λ m ) = 1/2, i ∈ {1, 2}. In each district i, the level of enforcement x i is financed either by the district itself, at amount g i ≥ 0, or subsidized by the other district, at the amount s −i ≥ 0. Given the unit size of districts, all variables are expressed per capita. The enforcement applies to all criminal activities organized in the district, regardless of the target. The total level of enforcement is x i = g i + s −i , and if voluntary transfers are not feasible (e.g., police is being completely autonomous, or in the presence of other administrative barriers to transfers of resources), then s 1 = s 2 = 0.
A key assumption is that criminals are specialized and district-oriented, so there are criminals targeting District 1 and criminals targeting District 2. The criminals are perfectly mobile and select the district for organization/residence to face the lowest enforcement (hitting the weakest-link of crime protection). As discussed in the introduction, assume that productivity of law enforcement drops by parameter κ < 1 if criminals targeting a district i reside in a district −i; this reflects that some local knowledge from the target district cannot be used perfectly by police in the other district. A rational criminal targeting district i thus resides in a district k ∈ {i, −i} where k = arg min i,−i {x i , κx −i }, and the level of effective protection against 2 Besley and Coate (2003) note that the distributions must be symmetric and identical. This is unnecessarily restrictive since the purpose of these restrictions is only to align objective of a median-type politician with the welfare of their district. In our setup, the social optimum can be written as the optimum of a (possibly hypothetical) individual with a mean of preference for the public good; whenever the median is equal to the mean, then this individual in fact represents the median voter. The consequences of mean differing from median, implying a biased median policy, are discussed in the (de)centralization framework by Lockwood (2008) .
crime of the district i writes
Enforcement is financed through non-distortionary lump-sum district tax, t i ≥ 0. A unit of enforcement requires collecting per capita revenue p > 0 from each individual in either of the districts. (One may alternatively suppose fixed public funds with an opportunity cost of p.) In decentralization without transfers, each district can only pay expenditures for domestic enforcement, and the tax is t i = pg i . In decentralization with transfers, the tax is written as t i = p(g i + s i ). In centralization, the tax is determined by the cost-sharing rule over total costs p(x 1 + x 2 ).
We study fixed cost sharing and Nash bargaining. Cost sharing is defined by a pair (α, β), where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of local enforcement in District 1 paid by District 1, and β ∈ [0, 1] is the share of local enforcement in District 2 paid by District 2. Fixed cost sharing is equivalent to imposing the following restrictions: (g 1 , s 1 ) = (αx 1 , (1−β)x 2 ) and (g 2 , s 2 ) = (βx 2 , (1− α)x 1 ). Unlike fixed cost shares, Nash bargaining divides costs such that the product of the delegates' gains over their disagreement points, defined by decentralized production, is maximized.
An individual of type λ from district i has a utility function that is linear in the private (or alternative) consumption and concave in the effective crime protection,
Let q(G) be an increasing and concave C 3 -function satisfying q(0) = 0, lim G→0 + q (G) = +∞, and g (G) > 0. We may interpret it as a probability of avoiding damage λ, capturing all interactions between deterrence expenditures and criminals' avoidance activities (see Langlais, 2008) . Since individuals are risk-neutral in private consumption, sufficiently large income y > 0 is assumed only for the citizens to be able to meet any tax obligation. For convenience, let u m i := u i (λ m , G i , t i ). Notice that quasi-linearity immediately rules out cash-transfers, because the marginal rate of the substitution between private and public consumption is independent of the amount of private consumption. With quasi-linearity, neutrality of cash transfers goes entirely through private consumption, hence the only effect of a voluntary cash transfer would be the redistribution of private consumption from the donor to the recipient.
The timing is as follows: In Stage 1, both districts independently and simultaneously delegate two purely policy-seeking delegates, one each. The delegates characterized by parameters (λ d 1 , λ d 2 ) are the majority-preferred types. Like in Besley and Coate (2003) , the pair of delegates is majority preferred if, in each district, a majority of citizens prefer the type of their representative to any other type, given the other district's representative type. Hence, the types are district's Condorcet winners. Later in the text, in order to obtain the majority-preferred types, we follow the logic that due to the quasiconcavity of preferences over the amount of effective crime enforcement, the equilibrium pair is identical as if the Stage 1 was reduced to a non-cooperative game of median voters from the two districts. Three types of best responses of the median voters may arise: sincere delegation where the median voter in district i promotes a candidate of identical type
In line with the literature, we may call the preference for low public spending conservative, and preference for high public spending to be progressive.
In Stage 2, we distinguish between decentralization and centralization. For decentralization, each delegate non-cooperatively and simultaneously chooses their contribution to the domestic enforcement, g i ≥ 0, and voluntary transfer to the other district, s i ≥ 0, if allowed. In centralization, the elected policy makers select the allocation that is efficient from their joint perspective, and divide the costs either by shares (α, β) or by Nash bargaining. Thereby, we compare two polar arrangements: non-cooperative decentralization and cooperative centralization.
Social optimum
In this section, we will determine the socially optimal amounts of local enforcements (inputs) and, consequently, the levels of effective crime protection (outputs). Since utility is linear in private consumption, the distribution of costs is irrelevant from the Pareto-perspective. Thus, without a loss of generality, we impose x i = g i . By the linearity of utility in private consumption, the set of Pareto-efficient allocations must maximize the sum of utilities of all individuals in both districts,
To identify the social optimum, notice that by the equality of the mean and median in both distributions,
In other words, the social optimum is an argument maximizing the joint welfare of median voters,
We maximize the joint welfare in (1) first by identifying optimal shares of the fixed total costs, i.e. dx 1 + dx 2 = 0. Under this restriction, dx −i /dx i = −1. From the total differential, we focus only on the marginal benefits associated with an increase in x i , and corresponding disutilities associated with a decrease in x −i :
We have three cases,
, and x i > x −i /κ. The marginal benefits for each case are listed in Table 1 . Table 1 : Marginal (dis)utilities of an increase in x i under fixed total costs, dx i + dx −i = 0
We insert terms from Table 1 into (2), to derive that under dx i +dx −i = 0,
Clearly, if the share of x i in total production is relatively low, the utilitarian criterion yields to increase the share, whereas if it is relatively high, it yields to decrease it. This is illustrated on Fig. 1 , where arrows on costneutral line dx 1 + dx 2 = 0 indicate Pareto-dominant moves, which involve an increase in G i with G −i being constant.
The optimum lies in the intermediate part, where the interior first order condition is a candidate for the optimum, λ m κ[q (κx 1 )−q (κx 2 )] = 0. Due to strict concavity of q(·), this implies symmetry, x 1 = x 2 . Imposing symmetry into (1), the condition for the socially optimal enforcement spending, 4. Decentralization
No voluntary transfers
Besley and Coate (2003) found that if districts provide local public goods with spillovers, and the goods are pure substitutes, decentralization without transfers leads to sincere delegation, but also to underprovision. Dur and Roelfsema (2005) highlight that if the local public goods are strategic substitutes, decentralization in addition leads to strategic delegation of low-types. Underprovision is thus even stronger.
In this section, we show that these effects may also be sensitive to the assumption of zero voluntary transfers. Our case with criminals targeting the weakest-link district is particularly helpful: Without transfers, decentralization yields extreme underprovision; with transfers, it may even achieve the social optimum. Absent other effects, the introduction of a realistic possibility of voluntary transfers strikingly modifies the welfare properties of non-cooperative equilibria.
Proposition 1 In decentralization without transfers, for any pair of delegates (λ d 1 , λ d 2 ) ∈ R + , a unique Nash equilibrium is characterized by the zero provision, g 1 = g 2 = 0.
The proposition is driven by the fact that for κ < 1, the delegates strategically undershoot each other level of deterrence, and their best responses intersect in zero, regardless of the preferences for enforcement. (Proofs of this as well as all subsequent propositions have been relegated to the Appendix.) This is illustrated by solid line arrows on Fig. 1 . As a result, voters have no incentive to behave strategically, and the possibility to vote strategically in Stage 1 brings no change to the race to the ultimate bottom. The incentive to strategically undershoot can be remedied only if each delegateat least on the margin-controlled the foreign level of enforcement, not the domestic level. This motivates to introduce voluntary transfers into the model.
Voluntary transfers
Transfers are typically considered an important instrument in the presence of spillovers (Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2007) and in cross-jurisdictional bargaining (Harstad 2007 (Harstad , 2008 . In the context of weakest-link public goods, the opportunity to compensate another, less interested district has been highlighted by Vicary (1990) , studied by Sandler and Vicary (2001), Vicary and Sandler (2002) , and experimentally tested by Lei et al. (2007) . Gregor (2008) shows that transfers give rise to strategic complementarities only for local spending being pure, not impure complements.
In our case, non-cooperative transfers solve the apparent problem that marginal rates of transformation of 'inputs' (local enforcement levels) are district-specific, which implies gains from specialization across districts. As we will see, each district is typically willing to contribute to the less productive foreign enforcement relatively more than to the more productive domestic enforcement, because relatively lower productivity makes the foreign district a more attractive option for criminals. For this purpose especially, we consider identical districts, i.e. we disregard motivation for transfers resulting from exogenous taste differences.
To start with, examine incentives in the policy-making sub-game of delegates (Stage 2). By the Slutsky duality, the necessary condition for the best response (and henceforth for a Nash equilibrium) is that each delegate minimizes costs for the given amount of the output. We use this rather trivial property of the equilibrium to deliver the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In Nash equilibrium of the sub-game of delegates for decentralization with transfers, at least one of the districts contributes nothing to its own enforcement, g 1 = 0 or g 2 = 0.
What is apparently unrealistic is that a district should fully specialize on providing resources in the other district. This is one of key findings of this setup, but it should be interpreted with caution. In reality, major part of spending on enforcement is pre-determined irrespective of the strategic considerations related to our class of crimes. It has extra use beyond reducing activities of strategically relocated criminals as envisioned here. Another plausible restriction is 'home bias' (cf. Sandler and Vicary, 2001) , when a transfer is restricted not to exceed the level domestic spending, s i ≤ g i . A careful reading of the model is that ceteris paribus, possibility to contribute to the foreign enforcement is key for the success of decentralized enforcement of this class of crimes.
To simplify our search for equilibrium, we introduce an extra notation: For any delegate i, let S-strategy be any strategy for which g i = 0, and T-strategy be any strategy for which g i > 0. Strategy profiles are, using this notation and ordering (Delegate 1, Delegate 2), classified into SS-, ST-, TS-, or TT-profiles. Through Lemma 1, the TT-profile is never in equilibrium.
Next, notice that any ST-profile implies s 2 > 0 (and TS-profile implies s 1 > 0). The proof is simple: If not and s 2 = 0, then
Since g 2 > 0, this violates the cost-minimization at least for Delegate 2 (a decrease in g 2 > 0 will not affect G 2 and at the same time will decrease costs).
To summarize: The T-strategy of delegate i in equilibrium is always characterized by g i > 0 and s i > 0, while for the S-strategy, we have g i = 0 and s i ≥ 0. The T-strategy thus can be re-interpreted as a strict two-input strategy (paying both domestic and foreign enforcement), whereas the Sstrategy is a weak single-input strategy (paying only the foreign enforcement, if anything).
The useful property of quasi-linear preferences is that the marginal utility of public consumption is independent of the amount of private consumption, and the marginal utility of private consumption is constant. Therefore, we can define an optimal amount of output for each strategy type (S-strategy or T-strategy), purely as a function of λ. For S-strategy, we think of an interior optimum, that is a delegate i using the S-strategy is not bound by the insufficient amount of
Precisely, let G S (λ) be the optimal amount of the local output that a citizen of type λ prefers to be provided if any additional output requires from their paying only extra foreign input. Let G T (λ) be the optimal amount of the local output preferred by a citizen of type λ if any extra output requires their paying both domestic and foreign input. For a delegate of type λ d i , we use for convenience G S i and G T i . To express the optimal amount for the S-strategy, notice that the marginal cost of an extra unit of output is p/κ. This is from dG i = κds i , and the cost in terms of extra tax is dt i = pds i = dG · p/κ. In the interior optimum, the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of an extra unit of output,
For the T-strategies, the cost of an extra output unit is p(1 + 1/κ). From dG i = min{dg i , κds i }, and the fact both inputs are increased effectively,
In the interior optimum, the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of a unit of extra output, thus
Since the marginal cost per extra output unit is 1 + κ-times higher under the T-strategy, G T (λ) < G S (λ). From the implicit function theorem on (5) and (6), see also that optimal amounts increase in preference for crime protection,
Most importantly, the values of these interior optimal outputs are not affected by the strategy of the other delegate, (g −i , s −i ); later we will see that the delegate −i only affects the feasibility of G S i and G T i . For convenience, let S(λ) be the total amount of the foreign inputs corresponding to G S (λ), S(λ) := G S (λ)/κ. Similarly, let T (λ) be the total amount of the foreign inputs x −i corresponding to G T (λ), T (λ) := G T (λ)/κ. For delegates and citizens of median types, introduce
. By comparing (4) and (5), notice
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This means that if the median-type candidates (λ d 1 = λ d 2 = λ m ) expect an SS-profile, each of them prefers in their interior optimum s i = S m , which is also the socially optimal allocation. In Lemma 2 below, we show that this efficient SS-profile actually is a strict Nash equilibrium. Stability is preserved by the fact that since κs i ≤ s −i = s i , we have G i = min{s −i , κs i } = κs i , so the strategic situation of the delegate i resembles the consumption of a pure private good G i for price p/κ, without any externality to consumption of the other delegate.
Lemma 2 proves that a pair of identical-type candidates deliver a symmetric SS-profile, not an ST-or TS-profile (recall TT-profile has been eliminated by Lemma 1).
Lemma 2
We found that with in-kind transfers, identical-type delegates manage to install their joint optimum, even in a non-cooperative mode. By (1), this allocation is socially optimal, if the delegates are unbiased (median types). The next question is whether the median-type delegates are in equilibrium in delegation stage (Stage 1), where voters determine the optimal delegate for policy-making stage (Stage 2). The next Proposition 2 specifies a sufficient condition under which the median delegates are indeed in equilibrium in the delegation stage. This is also a sufficient condition for the social optimum to be immune to strategic delegation.
Proposition 2
In decentralization with voluntary transfers, the delegation of median-type representatives,
The condition in (8) has the following interpretation: The median voter, expecting sincere delegation, has only two options. Either sincere delegation, involving efficient SS-profile with symmetric cost-shares, or conservative delegation, involving inefficient ST-profile with asymmetric cost-shares. In the latter option, Delegate 1 fully free rides on Delegate 2. The condition says that the free-ride is not selected as long as loss from underprovision exceeds gain from free ride.
The condition is plotted in Fig. 2 as the positive difference between the utility at a symmetric efficient SS-profile, expressed by the maximum of u S 2
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(by symmetry, max u S 1 (λ m ) = max u S 2 (λ m )), and the utility at a free-riding ST-profile, expressed by maximum of u T 1 , achieved when free ride is absolute, g 1 = s e 1 = 0. To derive the shape of the u T 1 schedule, it is sufficient to notice that (i) for all ST-profiles induced by Delegate 2, (x 1 , x 2 ) = (κT 2 , T 2 ), thus du T 1 + du T 2 = 0, and the profiles differ only in distribution of costs; and (ii) for
Next, we show how the stability of the efficient SS-profile in decentralization is affected by a change in the interdependence between the districts. Interdependence can be understood as the relative importance of foreign to domestic enforcement. The importance grows when κ falls, because criminals gain an extra incentive to displace to a relatively less productive district.
In Proposition 3, we show that, non-intuitively, the more interdependent the districts are, the more likely it is that decentralization is socially optimal. In other words, the more attractive it is for criminals to reside elsewhere, the less attractive is free riding ST-profile to the efficient SS-profile.
Proposition 3 Let κ ∈ (2/3, 1). If (8) holds for κ =κ, then it holds also for κ <κ. If (8) does not hold for κ =κ, then it does not hold for κ >κ either.
Centralization
In cooperative centralization, delegates seize all of the benefits of cooperation. This makes centralization a seemingly very attractive mode. Yet even though delegates dispose of perfect cooperation devices under this type of centralization, social optimum is not guaranteed. The explanation lies in the incentive of non-cooperative rational voters to elect different than mediantype delegates, and thereby affect the distribution of surplus in the sub-game of delegates. Strategic delegation is one of the key shortcomings of centralized arrangements, as well as a major obstacle to any bargaining.
Strategic delegation is a phenomenon with multiple applications in economics, e.g. in monetary policy (Chari et al., 2004) , industrial organization, tax competition (Brueckner, 2004) or environmental economics (Buchholz et al., 2005) . Conservative (low value of public spending) delegation is typically used to strategically decrease the breakdown allocation, and induce relatively larger compensations (Segendorff, 1998) . In contrast, progressive (high value of public spending) delegation has an advantage in the case of fixed cost-sharing rules (Besley and Coate, 2003) , and also if the proportion of shared costs is large (Dur and Roelfsema, 2005) .
Strategic delegation in our case relates to a dichotomy in devices available in each stage: In electoral Stage 1, voters in one district play noncooperatively with voters from the other district, whereas in the policymaking Stage 2, the delegates play cooperatively. Non-cooperative voters on one hand welcome the surplus from cooperation, but on the other hand try to improve their odds by effectively delegating someone with different preferences, at the cost of some distortion. In our case, we shall see that a burden of distortion may be fully born by the other district, which induces strict deviation from sincere delegation. Section 5.1 calculates the provision of goods for all pairs of delegates. In Section 5.2, we show that strategic delegation introduces welfare loss under all fixed cost shares (α, β), with only one exception. As a robustness check, Section 5.3 proves that if delegates split a positive surplus by Nash bargaining, the social optimum cannot be achieved either. Like fixed cost shares, Nash bargaining is not delegation-proof.
Cooperative allocation
The joint objective function of the two policy makers who cooperate in the provision of local enforcement is
Exactly like in Section 3.2, we maximize (9) by first optimizing under the fixed total costs, dx i + dx −i = 0. Under this restriction, we again focus only on the marginal benefits associated with an increase in x i (and respective decrease in x −i ). Again, there are three cases,
, and x i ≥ x −i /κ. We can see, by analogy to (3) , that under dx i + dx −i = 0,
Like in the derivation of the social optimum, the optimum lies in the middle interval. To obtain it, we first derive the interior optimum for the marginal welfare in the middle interval, (x i ,x −i ). Using the FOC, it is implicitly characterized as follows:
Unlike in the social optimum, it is not here guaranteed that this interior optimum lies in the middle interval,x i ∈ [κx −i , x −i /κ], if asymmetry of delegate types is large enough. The cooperative outcome, (x C 1 , x C 2 ), may involve also corners x C i ∈ {κx C −i , x C −i /κ}, hence satisfies for any i
, we may identify the interior values straightforwardly from the FOC imposed on (9),
Comparing (10) with (7), we can see that the social optimum is achieved if and only if both delegates are of median types,
Fixed cost shares
It is an established fact that incentives for strategic delegation primarily depend on the structure of costs paid in cooperation (Dur and Roelfsema 2005) , specifically on the amount of enforcement subsidized in the other district. Although the cost sharing itself does not affect the cooperation between delegates, it may introduce an element of conflict among the voters in the delegation stage. Recall now that a fixed cost sharing is defined by a pair of shares (α, β) of local enforcement paid within the districts, where (g 1 , s 1 ) = (αx 1 , (1 − β)x 2 ) and (g 2 , s 2 ) = (βx 2 , (1 − α)x 1 ). The contribution of this section is to examine if the conflict arises for reasons other than the often postulated equal-cost sharing (Besley and Coate 2003); equal-cost sharing is, in our notation, a special case of (α, β) = (1/2, 1/2). We again use the fact that median voters are decisive in their districts. We will focus on their best responses in the non-cooperative game in delegation Stage 1. Since we are only interested in the stability of the socially optimal allocation, and this allocation by (10) can be achieved only via median-type delegates, this task is reduced to discerning whether mediantype delegates are preserved in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 rejects this possibility for all but one case of cost sharing, to be called a delegation-proof cost sharing. With this exception, it proves that if a median voter expects a median-type delegate from the other district, they have an incentive to vote for a progressive delegate.
Proposition 4
In centralization with strategic delegation and fixed cost shares (α, β), median-type delegates λ d 1 = λ d 2 = λ m are part of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, if and only if (α, β) = (0, 0).
Nash bargaining
Nash bargaining maximizes the product of the utility differences over the decentralized equilibrium (henceforth denoted by superscript D). The bargaining outcome apparently depends on the equilibrium in decentralization, where we distinguish between the case of the degenerated production (in the absence of transfers), the case of a specialization SS-profile, and the free-riding ST-profile. The following Propositions 5 and 6 show for all cases, there is always an incentive for strict deviation from the median-type delegation towards progressive delegation, as long as cooperation yields a non-zero surplus.
The cost paid by each individual in district i is t i . Since Nash-bargaining yields an allocation efficient for the delegates, it must be for sufficiently symmetrical (e.g., median-type) delegates an SS-profile, where G 1 = min{x 1 , κx 2 } = κx 2 = κS 1 , and by analogy G 2 = κS 2 . Total costs are t 1 + t 2 = p(x 1 + x 2 ) = p(S 1 + S 2 ). The Nash bargaining outcome is characterized by the following cost-shares:
Since utility is linear in transferable costs, and bargaining power is identical across delegates, the Nash bargaining equalizes the net surplus across the delegates,
We will use this property of the derived cost shares in the analysis of the case when transfers are not allowed in decentralization.
Proposition 5
In centralization with strategic delegation and Nash bargaining improving upon decentralization without transfers, the median-type delegates λ d 1 = λ d 2 = λ m are not in a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
With transfers, decentralization may deliver an efficient SS-profile, hence cooperation only preserves this allocation. As we will see, such an outcome is delegation-proof as long as the delegates are median types. In all remaining cases, cooperative centralization is not delegation-proof.
Proposition 6
In centralization with strategic delegation and Nash bargaining improving upon decentralization with transfers, median-type delegates λ d 1 = λ d 2 = λ m are a part of a sub-game perfect equilibrium if and only if decentralization is socially efficient.
6. Centralization tradeoff and extension to n > 2 regions Table 2 summarizes the main findings by comparing welfare in decentralization (D) and centralization (C), under all possible institutional configurations and all levels of κ (a total of six cases). The Pareto-dominance of centralization over decentralization is denoted C D, and Pareto-equivalence C ∼ D. Social optimum is noted with G * or just a star in the superscript, if equivalent to either of the arrangements. 
The tradeoffs summarize Propositions 2, 4, 5, and 6. Non-cooperative decentralization is socially efficient (D * ), if transfers are feasible and interdependence is high, i.e. κ is low (Cases 4, 6); it is inefficient (G * D) either in the absence of transfers (Cases 1, 2), or for transfers but with interdependence (Cases 3, 5). Cooperative centralization is socially efficient (C * ) either if delegation is sincere (Cases 1, 3, 4) , or if delegation is strategic but cost shares are delegation-proof (Column 2 in Cases 2, 5, 6). It is obviously also efficient if Nash bargaining only replicates the disagreement point (Column 3 in Cases 4,6). In the other cases, centralization is inefficient, G * C.
What is particularly interesting is to compare Cases 1 and 6 (Column 1). Case 1 represents a traditional setup in the literature on decentralization: no transfers, sincere delegates, and equal cost sharing. Case 6 is nothing but an extension of the setup by realistic assumptions of voluntary in-kind transfers and strategic delegation under sufficiently large interdependence. The extension itself completely reverts the centralization tradeoff; in Case 1, C * D, whereas in Case 6, D * C. It is a combination of two effects that switches the tradeoff: transfers weakly improve the performance of decentralization, and strategic delegation weakly worsens the efficiency of centralization.
To analyze a multilateral case, consider first a case when all districts are crime-targeted. Then, results are unchanged because in decentralization with transfers, each district again tends to specialize on controlling enforcement in one of the other, less productive districts. This establishes a multilateral version of a specialization SS-profile. The main result is also intact in the presence of non-targeted districts, if there is just a single targeted district. Then, the district provides nothing if transfers are not allowed, but with transfers, effectively funds enforcement in all non-targeted districts. This is socially efficient, because crime protection is consumed only in the targeted district.
The analysis complicates with non-targeted districts, in the presence of several targeted districts. Then, spending in the non-targeted districts has a collective good property. This obviously works against efficiency of decentralization, and the problem grows, the larger is the number of targeted districts. Note that the number of non-targeted districts is strategically irrelevant, since contributions to them, albeit featuring complementarities, are always strategic substitutes to contributions of other districts. For efficiency of decentralized crime deterrence, the existence of a few 'safe havens' in non-targeted districts is therefore more important than the existence of many targeted districts where criminals can relocate.
Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the efficiency of non-cooperative decentralization and cooperative centralization in the provision of local non-rival crime deterrence when criminals are mobile, and criminal opportunities are immobile. In the context of two symmetrical districts, we study to what extent voluntary in-kind transfers and strategic delegation affect the relative benefits of centralization vis-a-vis decentralization.
The transfers are found to enhance the efficiency of decentralization; non-cooperative decentralization with transfers may even reach the social optimum. Strategic delegation is found to worsen the efficiency of cooperative centralization, except for a special case of delegation-proof cost-sharing. As a result, the decentralization theorem for this class of criminal activities and deterrence efforts crucially depends on the feasibility of transfers and strategic delegation.
In a standard case with sincere delegates and the absence of transfers, centralization dominates decentralization. In contrast, with strategically nominated delegates who are allowed to provide in-kind transfers, decentralization dominates centralization at least for the sufficiently large asymmetry in local productivity. That is, if criminals relative more tend to strategically move to a less endangering district so as to avoid the use of local expertise, then the decentralization is more efficient. Perhaps surprisingly, the benefits of centralization are therefore not related to high interdependence among the districts, but rather to the lack of thereof.
For g 1 > 0 and g 2 > 0, this implies 1 = κ 2 , which is false. Therefore, g 1 = 0 or g 2 = 0. To sum up, regardless of where the equilibrium profile appears, there always exists i, such that g i = 0. 2 Proof of Lemma 2. Using Lemma 1, impose g 1 = 0 without a loss of generality, hence we restrict ourselves to the ST and SS profiles. We proceed as follows-in the first part, we identify the best response of Delegate 2. In the second part, we check the best response of Delegate 1 to the best response of Delegate 2, to see when the equilibrium beliefs of Delegate 2 are correct beliefs.
• DELEGATE 2: Examine the best response of Delegate 2 (g 2 , s 2 ) as a function of the expected s e 1 . This is possible because S-strategy of Delegate 1 is (0, s 1 ), which is fully characterized by s 1 . To recognize where Delegate 2 selects the S-strategy or T-strategy, we first find an optimal response of Delegate 2 limited to the set of SS profiles (denoted as g S 2 (s e 1 ), s S 2 (s e 1 )), and an optimal response limited to the set of the ST profiles (denoted as g T 2 (s e 1 ), s T 2 (s e 1 )); the response with maximum utility yields the true best response. i) SS-PROFILES: Consider the S-strategy. Here, G 2 = min{s e 1 , κs 2 }. To provide s 2 > s e 1 /κ is useless due to complementarity with the input x 2 = s e 1 . To provide s 2 > S 2 is also sub-optimal as it implies G 2 > G S (λ d 2 ). The best among the S-strategies thus writes s S 2 (s e 1 ) = min{s e 1 /κ, S 2 } and g S 2 (s e 1 ) = 0. ii) ST-PROFILES: Consider the T-strategy. Here, G 2 = min{g 2 + s e 1 , κs 2 }. Delegate 2 can provide s 2 at any amount since the complementarity with input x 2 is not restrictive (he or she can raise g 2 to boost x 2 ). Therefore, the best among the T-strategies yields
Since by the definition of a T-strategy, g 2 > 0, the T-strategy is feasible to Delegate 2 only for g T 2 (s e 1 ) = κT 2 − s e 1 > 0, i.e. only for s e 1 < κT 2 .
The payoffs for the best S-strategy and the best T-strategy are:
To identify the true best response, Fig. 2 
Next, evaluate the functions at s e 1 = κT 2 . Since the T-strategy (and the ST-profile) is only available for s e 1 < κT 2 , we evaluate the limit value of the ST-profile in a supremum of the interval [0, κT 2 ):
To conclude, the best response of Delegate 2 is T-strategy for s e 1 < κT 2 and S-strategy for s e 1 ≥ κT 2 .
• DELEGATE 1: The next condition necessary to hold in equilibrium is that the best response of Delegate 1 to g 2 (s e 1 ) and s 2 (s e 1 ) must be s 1 = s e 1 and g 1 = 0, hence the equilibrium beliefs are correct. First, we prove that for the pair of identical-type delegates, λ d 1 = λ d 2 , the ST-profile is never a Nash equilibrium. Second, we identify a unique equilibrium SS-profile. i) ST-PROFILES. We have found that the T-strategy is the true best response of Delegate 2, as long as s e 1 < κT 2 . The best response writes (g 2 , s 2 ) = (κT 2 − s e 1 , T 2 ). The output for Delegate 1 on this best response is G 1 = min{T 2 , κ(κT 2 − s e 1 + s 1 )}. If this were an equilibrium, then s 1 = s e 1 and G 1 = κ 2 T 2 < T 2 . Notice that enforcement x 1 is excessive from the perspective of Delegate 1, hence the delegate can boost their output G 1 only by marginally increasing x 2 . Delegate 1 is willing to do so (by increasing s 1 , thereby increasing x 2 ), as long as x 2 < S 1 . This is exactly the case here because for the symmetrical delegates, x 2 = κT 2 < κS 2 = κS 1 < S 1 . As a result, no ST-profile can be an equilibrium.
ii) SS-PROFILES. We have found that the S-strategy is the true best response of Delegate 2, as long as s e 1 ≥ κT 2 . The best response is written (g 2 , s 2 ) = (0, min{s e 1 /κ, S 2 }). Suppose there is an equilibrium, s 1 = s e 1 . We distinguish between two cases: * Low s e 1 : For s e 1 ∈ [κT 2 , κS 2 ], G 1 = min{s e 1 /κ, κs e 1 } = κs e 1 . From the perspective of Delegate 1, enforcement x 1 is excessive, and to boost the output, only a marginal increase in x 2 is required. Delegate 1 is willing to do so, as long as x 2 ≤ S 1 . This is exactly the case here for the symmetrical delegates and this interval of s e 1 , s e 1 ≤ κS 2 = κS 1 < S 1 . Thus, low s e 1 cannot be in equilibrium. * High s e 1 : For s e 1 > κS 2 , the best S-strategy of Delegate 2 is s 2 = S 2 . This yields to Delegate 1 G 1 = min{S 2 , κs e 1 }. In the best response with S-strategy, Delegate 1 plays s 1 ≤ S 1 ; if unconstrained, s 1 = S 1 . Anticipating s 2 = S 2 doesn't constrain him, because S 2 = S 1 > κS 1 ≥ κs 1 . Thus G 1 = min{S 2 , κs 1 } = κs 1 , and Delegate 1 can play interior optimum s 1 = S 1 , with G 1 = G S 1 . This is stable because-as we already know-Delegate 2 responds by s 2 = S 2 and G 2 = G S 2 .
Given that the only equilibrium strategy of Delegate 2 is S-strategy with s 2 = S 2 , and the corresponding unique best response of Delegate 1 as s 1 = S 1 , the equilibrium is unique, (g 1 , s 1 , g 2 , s 2 ) = (0, S 1 , 0, S 2 ). 2 Proof of Proposition 2. We seek a sufficient condition for median-type delegates to be Condorcet winners in elections in each district. It is sufficient to analyse only the incentives for unilateral deviation from the symmetric median-type delegation, which by Lemma 2 delivers the social efficient SS-profile with (x 1 , x 2 ) = (S m , S m ), and (G 1 , G 2 ) = (κS m , κS m ). When considering such deviations, we use the fact that the Condorcet winner in each district is identical to the optimal delegate for the median voter (to be proved in the last part of this proof). Thus, Stage 1 is equivalent to a bilateral non-cooperative game of a pair of median voters from different districts.
The median voter in District 1 expects that only the SS, ST, or TSprofiles emerge in the sub-game of delegates. First, if the SS-profile occurs in the sub-game of delegates, any strategic delegation that involves s 1 = S m is obviously dominated by s 1 = S m , by the definition of the optimal G S (λ m ). Second, if the TS-profile occurs, the median voter in District 1 would lose Figure 2 : The utilities of the delegates for the best S-response and the best T-response of Delegate 2 to expected S-strategy of Delegate 1 in comparison to the social optimum, because its delegate would have to employ a more expensive two-input T-strategy (for any level of output). Thus, the only incentive for proper strategic delegation is to induce an STprofile, and thereby a free ride on District 2, whose median-type delegate is willing to resort to the expensive two-input strategy.
To keep the ST-profile in an equilibrium of the delegates' sub-game, the T-strategy must be the best response of Delegate 2. From the proof in Lemma 2, the T-strategy is the best response, if s e 1 < κT 2 . The best response is g 2 = κT 2 − s e 1 and s 2 = T 2 . Next, the output in District 1 is G 1 = min{s 2 + g 1 , κ(g 2 + s 1 )} = min{T 2 , κ(κT 2 − s e 1 + s 1 )}. In this equilibrium, we require s 1 = s e 1 , thus G 1 = κ 2 T 2 . We know the output and best response of Delegate 2, hence it remains to check best response of Delegate 1. Output for Delegate 1 is, considering possible deviations,
1 would deviate by increasing s 1 such that x 2 = S 1 . Therefore, the stability of ST-profile in equilibrium requires S 1 ≤ κT 2 . Notice that for such a pair of delegates, κT 1 < κS 1 < S 1 ≤ κT 2 , i.e. κT 1 < κT 2 and Delegate 1 must be relatively more conservative than Delegate 2, λ d 1 < λ d 2 . Next, for Delegate 1 who is exactly on the margin, S 1 = κT 2 , there are multiple equilibria in Stage 2, differing only in the distribution of g 2 + s 1 = κT 2 . For any slightly more conservative Delegate 1, characterized by S 1 < κT 2 , the best response is s 1 = S 1 − g 2 = S 1 − κT 2 + s e 1 < s e 1 , and there is only a unique equilibrium with s 1 = 0, where the non-negativity constraint applies. Since both cases yield an identical G 1 , delegating the indifferent delegate is-from the perspective of median voter in District 1-weakly dominated by delegating a sufficiently conservative delegate. Finally, the payoff for the median voter in District 1 for this ST-profile is λ m q(κ 2 T m ). Since we check deviation from sincere delegation, we evaluate it for T 2 = T m , and this is compared with the payoff for the symmetrically efficient SS-profile, λ m q(κS m ) − pS m , which yields the condition in (8) . Now, we show that the existence of other-than-median voters brings no changes to the outcome. If an SS-profile is expected, voters within a district have single-peaked preferences over s 1 , because S(λ) < S(λ) if and only if λ < λ. This means that within SS-profiles, Condorcet-winner-value of s 1 corresponds to s 1 = S m . Within the ST-profiles, there is no conflict of interest within District 1, since the output G 1 = κ 2 T 2 is independent of type. As a result, each voter of type λ in District 1 compares his or her utilities of the two profiles and prefers SS-profile if
The left-hand-side is clearly increasing in λ, and the right-hand-side is constant, hence if (8) holds, then (14) holds at least for the majority of voters of λ ≥ λ m types. Hence, the median-type-preferred profile is also a majority-preferred profile, i.e. the Condorcet winner. This completes the proof. 2 Proof of Proposition 3. Denote the utility difference as V := λ m q(κG T )− λ m q(G S ) + pG S /κ. The Proposition aims to show that V grows in κ,
Define the elasticities of the optimal outputs with respect to the level of κ:
This allows us to write G T + κ(∂G T /∂κ) = G T + ε T G T = G T (1 + ε T ), ∂G S /∂κ = ε S G S /κ, and
Imposing the second and third terms from ∂V /∂κ, and using q (G S ) = p/(λ m κ),
From the concavity of q(·), q (κG T ) > q (G T ) = p(1 + κ)/(λ m κ). Hence, we may identify a sufficient condition for ∂V /∂κ > 0:
Now, it is convenient to introduce the function F (x) := q −1 (x). From the concavity of q(·) and from q (·) > 0, F (·) is decreasing and convex, F (x) = q −1 (x) < 0 and F (x) = q −1 (x) > 0. From this shape, we derive:
Using G T < G S , an even more restrictive sufficient condition writes:
Now, from the definition of the elasticity ε S , and by derivating G S , ∂G S ∂κ = F p λ m κ −p λ m κ 2 , we have F (p/λκ) /G S = −ε S λ m κ/p. This allows us to write the final sufficient condition for (15) as κ(1 + κ)(1 + ε T ) > 1 + ε S κ, or
It is easy to calculate that the first term is positive, as long as κ > ( √ 5 − 1)/2 > 2/3. From the definition of elasticities and from the convexity of F (·), we obtain the positivity of the second term,
As a result, κ > 2/3 is a sufficient condition for ∂V /∂κ > 0. 
We apply the implicit function theorem on (10), and derive:
Plugging (17) into (16), we recognize that for λ d 1 = λ m to be an interior optimum of the median voter in District 1, we need x 2 (given by the cooperation of the delegates) to satisfy exactly λ m κq (κx 2 ) = (1 − β)p. By inspecting (10) , this is exactly when β = 0. For any β > 0, the FOC of the median voter yields a strategically progressive delegate, = − q(κS 1 ) 2 < 0. (18) We used that in the bargaining outcome for median-type delegates, 2λ m − λ d 1 = λ m , and λ d 1 κq (κS 1 ) − p = 0. The equation (18) shows that it pays off to strictly deviate from sincere to conservative delegation. 2 Proof of Proposition 6. We have to distinguish between the SS-profile and ST-profile in decentralization. i) SS-profile. For sufficiently symmetrical delegates, the SS-profile in decentralization satisfies (x 1 , x 2 ) = (S 2 , S 1 ) and is efficient from the delegates' point of view. Hence, Nash bargaining delivers an identical allocation, and the total surplus is zero. Since the efficient outcome is also a disagreement point, the zero surplus cannot be divided in any other way but zero for each. As a result, there is no strict incentive for strategic delegation and the median-type delegates are in equilibrium.
ii) ST-profile. We have G D 1 = κ 2 T 2 , G D 2 = κT 2 , t D 1 = 0, and t D 2 = p(1 + κ)T 2 . In the bargaining outcome, we have G C 1 = κS 1 , G C 2 = κS 2 . From the equality of net surpluses,
2 q(κT 2 ) + p(1 + κ)T 2 − t 2 , we derive the division of costs as follows:
The utility of the median voter in District 1 is again, u m 1 = λ m q(κS 1 )+ y −t 1 . Inserting t 1 into the FOC, evaluated for a median type delegate, shows that the median-type delegate does not maximize utility of the median voter: Again, we used this in the bargaining outcome for median-type delegates, λ d 1 κq (κS 1 ) − p = 0, and moreover S 1 > T 1 > κT 1 = κT 2 . Again, it pays off to deviate from sincere to conservative delegation. 2
